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Abstract
In Burkina Faso, the pre-1990s banking system was characterized by a high level of
government involvement and ownership, which led to government-induced lending rather
than lending based on creditworthiness. Nonperforming loans in the Burkinabe banking
system grew to 10 percent of total loans in 1991. In order to address the banking crisis in
1991, the Burkinabe government entered into a Structural Adjustment Facility with the IMF
and other multilateral organizations which prioritized the privatization of governmentowned enterprises and included rehabilitation of the financial system. As part of this
restructuring, the government established the Bureau de Recouvrement des Crédits du
Burkina (BRCB), which acquired nonperforming loans from the restructured banks with the
objective to liquidate and recover the assets. The BRCB operated in parallel with other bank
restructuring activities, which included recapitalization, reduction of government
ownership, and internal reorganization. In order to improve the BRCB’s recovery, the
government gave it special authority to seize assets from delinquent borrowers, and the
BRCB also published names of such borrowers in an official government publication. The
government dissolved the BRCB in 2002 and transferred the remaining portfolio of assets to
the Treasury. The BRCB acquired CFAF 64.4 billion (USD 224.8 million) in nonperforming
loans, and it recovered approximately CFAF 10.8 billion by the time of its dissolution in 2002.
Keywords: Burkina Faso, nonperforming loans, asset management companies, privatization

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs.
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Bureau de Recouvrement des Crédits du Burkina
(BRCB)
At a Glance
Burkina Faso, formerly Upper Volta, gained
independence from France in 1960. The country
experienced multiple political regime changes in
the years following its independence (Savadogo
et al. 2004). Burkina Faso is a member of the
West African Monetary Union (WAMU/UMOA)
which has a common central bank, the Banque
Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO),
which was founded in 1962 (World Bank 1993;
BCEAO 2020). Its common currency is the
CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine) Franc.
In 1990, Burkina Faso’s financial system
consisted of a national agency of the BCEAO, eight
banks with differing levels of state ownership,3 a
state postal saving and checking system,4 four
smaller consumer credit and equipment leasing
organizations,5 and a number of smaller mutual
aid organizations and cooperative societies in
rural areas (IMF 1996; IMF 1998). Most of the
banking system was established by the
government after Burkina Faso’s independence,
including BND-B, the development bank. BND-B
was given a prominent role in the economy, and
it extended long-term loans at low interest rates
for development projects. BND-B began facing
financial problems in 1978 and underwent

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: The “BRCB was established to liquidate,
to the extent possible, nonperforming loans that
were to be transferred to the Government in
exchange for an infusion of capital” (IMF 1996).
Launch Dates

Wind-down
Dates
Size and Type
of
NPL
Problem
Program Size
Eligible
Institutions
Usage
Outcomes
Ownership
Structure
Notable
Features

Announcement: 1991 (BCEAO
n.d.)
First transfer: 1991 (World
Bank 1993)
Dissolved by parliamentary
vote on November 12, 2002
(Tanga 2002)
10% of banking system loans in
1991
State-directed loans to stateowned enterprises
Not specified at outset
Only banks participating in
other
restructuring
and
recapitalization activities
Open and closed banks
CFAF 64.4 billion (USD 224.8
million) in NPLs transferred to
the BRCB (Tanga 2002)
CFAF 10.8 billion recovered as
of 2002 (Tanga 2002)
Government-owned
Special powers to seize and
collect from debtors; part of
banking system restructuring
package and IMF agreement

The eight banks include BALIB (Banque Arabe Libyenne Burkinabe), BFCI (Banque pour le Financement du
Commerce et de l'Industrie), BIB (Banque Internationale du Burkina), BICIA-B (Banque Internationale du
Commerce, de l’Industrie et de l'Artisanat du Burkina), CAI (Caisse Autonome d' Investissement), CNCA (Caisse
Nationale de Credit Agricole), UREBA (Union Revolutionnaire des Banques), and BND-B (Banque Nationale de
Developpement).
4 The postal checking system was the CCP (Comptes Chéques Postaux) while the postal saving system was the
CNE (Caisse Nationale d’Epargne).
5 These four consumer-credit and equipment-leasing agencies were FIB (Financiére du Burkina), SBE (Société
Burkinabe d'Equipement), SIEL (Société Internationale d'Equipement en Leasing), and SOBCA (Société Burkinabe
de Crédit Automobile).
3
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various reorganization attempts throughout the 1980s (IMF 1996).
According to the IMF, there was “severe government interference” in the Burkinabe banking
system prior to the banking crisis and “evidence of government-induced lending” (IMF
1996). 40 percent of commercial bank deposits were held by government agencies and
enterprises, and—within the postal banking system—deposits were frozen for a number of
years because the Treasury had used the deposits to finance current expenditures and was
unable to repay the deposits (IMF 1996).
In 1990, audits conducted by the BCEAO revealed that five of the eight Burkinabe banks had
high levels of nonperforming loans (NPLs). Across the five banks, there was an estimated
CFAF 49 billion (USD 171 million)6 in NPLs, but the banks had only provisioned CFAF 29
billion for loan losses. These five banks recorded losses of CFAF 21 billion and had a negative
net worth of CFAF 28 billion (World Bank 1993). By 1991, 10 percent of total Burkinabe
banking system loans were nonperforming; excluding short-term credit, 34 percent were
nonperforming (IMF 1996).
In 1991, the government of Burkina Faso entered into a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF)
agreement with the IMF. In exchange for Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of 22.1 million, the
government committed to following an economic strategy that included large-scale financial
system rehabilitation and restructuring (IMF 1991). As a part of the plan, the Burkinabe
government agreed to reduce the state’s participation in the capital of the banks to a
maximum of 25 percent and established a recovery agency, the Bureau de Recouvrement du
Crédit de Burkina (BRCB), for nonperforming loans (World Bank 1993). The BRCB’s objective
was to recover the value of nonperforming loans transferred from the liquidated and
restructured banks (IMF 1996).
The Burkinabe banks undergoing restructuring began to transfer NPLs to the BRCB in 1991.
Three public banks—the BFCI, CAI, and UREBA—were placed under temporary receivership
and merged, with CFAF 12 billion in NPLs transferred to the BRCB. BND-B was placed into
government-controlled administration in 1991 and transferred CFAF 19 billion in NPLs to
the BRCB. The BIB, which had an NPL ratio of 30 percent in 1990, transferred CFAF 17.8
billion in NPLs to the BRCB (IMF 1996).
In parallel with the removal of nonperforming assets from bank balance sheets, the
government reduced bank liabilities as shown in Figure 1 below. For the 1991 restructuring
activities, which totaled CFAF 49 billion in NPLs transferred to the BRCB and CFAF 21 billion
in loan losses written off, the government reduced total banking system liabilities by CFAF
70 billion.

As of March 31, 1990, $1 = CFAF 286.5 (Communauté Financière Africaine Franc, the African Financial
Community Franc).
6
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Figure 1. Bank Balance Sheet Restructuring in 1991
Reduction of Assets

Reduction of Liabilities

NPLs transferred to CFAF 49 billion*
BRCB

Provisions cancelled

CFAF 29 billion

Losses written off

Reduction of capital

CFAF 13 billion

CFAF 21 billion

Liabilities assumed by CFAF 25 billion
the Government
Government deposits CFAF 3 billion
lost
TOTAL

CFAF 70 billion

TOTAL

CFAF 70 billion

*Note: The BRCB ultimately acquired CFAF 64.4 billion in NPLs.

Source: World Bank 1993; Tanga 2002.
Despite the financial restructuring in 1991, the financial position of the banks continued to
deteriorate in 1992-93, as loan loss provisions were short by an estimated CFAF 16.2 billion
(World Bank 1993). Because of the continued problems at the BND-B, the government
appointed a liquidator for the bank in December 1993. Two financial leasing companies
transferred NPLs to the BRCB, and between 1991 and 1996, a total of CFAF 58.8 billion in
NPLs were transferred to the BRCB for recovery (IMF 1996).
In 1993, the Burkinabe government increased the BRCB’s legal authority, granting it the
same power as the Treasury to seize assets from delinquent borrowers. In order to improve
recovery efforts, the BRCB published a list of 5,400 names of delinquent borrowers in 1993
in the Official Journal. The BRCB’s portfolio included loans to private organizations that had
either ceased operations or were facing financial difficulties as well as loans to government
agencies and enterprises (IMF 1996).
Despite its special powers, when the BRCB was dissolved in 2002, its portfolio totaled CFAF
64.4 billion, and it had only recovered 17 percent, or CFAF 10.8 billion (Tanga 2002).
Summary Evaluation
According to the IMF, the BRCB was hamstrung by a number of factors, which included
delayed transmission of loan files, missing documentation, lack of digitalization, high legal
fees related to the liquidation of the BND-B, and lack of coordination with other enforcement
authorities (IMF 1996). The restructuring of the Burkinabe banking system was also
hampered by disputes between banks, the BCEAO, and the BRCB (Joseph 2002). The
Commission Bancaire, the bank supervision organization for the WAMU countries, found that
the BRCB had internal accounting and organizational issues (IMF 1996).
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Bureau de Recouvrement des Crédits du Burkina (BRCB): Burkina Faso Context
GDP
$2.63 billion in 1990
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$2.75 billion in 1991
USD)
GDP per capita
$298.50 in 1990
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$303.86 in 1991
USD)
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)
Ratings not available for 1990 and
1991
Size of banking system
Data not available for 1990 and 1991
Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system
5-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system

Government ownership of banking system

Existence of deposit insurance
Sources: IMF 1996; 1998; World Bank Database.
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Data not available for 1990 and 1991
Data not available for 1990 and 1991
Data not available for 1990 and 1991
Data not available for 1990 and 1991
Total government ownership by bank:
51% of BICIA-B,
25% of BIB,
6% of BND-B,
10% of BFCI,
27% of CNCA,
50% of BALIB
No in 1991 and 1992
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: The BRCB was a key component of the restructuring and
rehabilitation of the Burkinabe banking system.
In 1991, Burkina Faso entered into a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), which was
supported by the IMF, World Bank, and other bilateral and multilateral creditors (IMF 1996).
The IMF approved the SAF with special drawing rights (SDR) of 22.1 million on March 13,
1991, with a three-year term. The economic strategy had the goal to “reduce financial
imbalances and promote growth by increasing the role of the private sector while reducing
and refocusing that of the state” (IMF 1991).
As a part of its IMF arrangement, Burkina Faso embarked on an economic strategy that
included restructuring and rehabilitating the banking system. There were five components
of the banking system restructuring in Burkina Faso:
a) recapitalizing problem banks;
b) reducing the government’s share in banks to a non-controlling level;
c) creating the BRCB, a loan-recovery bureau for NPLs;
d) reorganizing and downsizing bank management; and
e) returning funds borrowed by the Treasury to the postal savings and checking
banks (CNE/CCP) (IMF 1996).
2. Legal Authority: The Burkinabe government passed a law in March 1991
establishing the BRCB.
On March 7, 1991, the government passed a law that established the BRCB.7 The government
also published an ordinance that outlined provisions for the BRCB’s operations (BCEAO
n.d.).8

The legislation, in French, was “J.O./B.F. n° 10 du 07 mars 1991 (création du BRCB).”
The ordinance title was "Zatu n° An VIII-19 FP-PRES, portant dispositions particulières applicables au
recouvrement des créances compromises des établissements de crédit cédées à l'Etat Burkinabé,” which translates
to an ordinance “laying down specific provisions applicable to the recovery of compromised debts of credit
institutions ceded to the Burkinabe State.”
7
8
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3. Special Powers: In 1993, the BRCB was granted special legal authority for debt
collection and recovery, as only back taxes were senior to BRCB claims. The BRCB
also published the names of delinquent borrowers in the official government
publication.
Two years after establishing the BRCB, the Burkinabe government elevated the BRCB’s legal
authority for debt recovery (IDA 1993). The 1993 legislation provided the BRCB with the
same level of authority to seize assets as the Treasury. Only back taxes were senior to BRCB
collection efforts. Despite the “powerful tools at its disposal,” the BRCB had recovered only
10% of the value of transferred assets by 1995 (IMF 1996).
4. Mandate: The BRCB’s mandate was to minimize losses and manage
nonperforming assets through the legal system by pursuing defaulting
borrowers.
According to the IMF, the BRCB had a mandate to “recover to the extent possible the portfolio
of nonperforming loans it had inherited from banks undergoing liquidation or restructuring”
(IMF 1996).
5. Ownership Structure: The BRCB was fully owned by the government.
The BRCB was a government-owned entity (IMF 1998).
6. Governance/Administration: The BRCB was housed in Burkina Faso’s Ministry of
Finance, and the BCEAO Governor chaired the bank supervisory body that had
oversight authority of the BRCB.
The BRCB was created in 1991 within Burkina Faso’s Ministry of Finance (IMF 1998). On
June 6, 1991, the government passed legislation that appointed a director of the BRCB
(BCEAO n.d.).9
Prior to the rehabilitation of the banking system, the BCEAO founded the Commission
Bancaire, the bank supervisory body for WAMU countries. It was established in 1990 with
headquarters in Cote d’Ivoire (IMF 1996; BCEAO n.d.).10 The Commission Bancaire, which
was chaired by the Governor of the BCEAO, conducted audits of the BRCB (IMF 1996).
7. Size: Though there does not appear to be a preestablished size for the BRCB, it
acquired a total of CFAF 64.4 billion in nonperforming assets.
It does not appear that the government set a maximum value of assets that the struggling
banks could transfer to the BRCB. By 1996, the Burkinabe banks had transferred a total of

Kiti n° An VIII-320 FP-MF, portant nomination d'un Directeur du Bureau de Recouvrement des Créances du
Burkina (BRCB) / J.O./B.F. n° 23 du 6 juin 1991.
10 Kiti n° An VIII-320 FP-MF, portant nomination d'un Directeur du Bureau de Recouvrement des Créances du
Burkina (BRCB) / J.O./B.F. n° 23 du 6 juin 1991.
9
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CFAF 58.8 billion to the BRCB, and when the agency was dissolved in 2002, a total of CFAF
64.4 billion in NPLs had been transferred (IMF 1996; Tanga 2002).
8. Funding Source: In order to finance the Burkinabe bank restructuring, the
government relied on asset sales, loans from banks and official lenders, and
Burkinabe taxpayers.
The transfer of NPLs was one component of the financial system restructuring, and the IMF
estimated that the total cost of bank restructuring in Burkina Faso was CFAF 48 billion. For
the restructuring activities of the state development bank, the BND-B, the government
borrowed CFAF 16 billion from the national social security fund (CNSS) under a six-year loan
with 9 percent interest. The government also borrowed CFAF 3.3 billion from the investment
bank, CAI, under a loan with a 15-year term carrying 3 percent interest. Furthermore, the
government converted the BND-B’s CFAF 9 billion debt to the BCEAO to long-term
government debt to the BCEAO with a 15-year maturity—including a three-year grace
period—and 3 percent interest rate (IMF 1998).
For the BIB, BICIA-B, and BFCI-B, the government reimbursed the banks for the transfer of
NPLs using government bonds with a value of CFAF 11.8 billion and a 15-year term, 21month repayment holiday, and 3 percent interest. Two financial leasing companies, the
SOBCA and SIEL, received financing of CFAF 1.5 billion in exchange for transferring their
NPLs to the BRCB (IMF 1998).
In addition to issuing bonds, the government relied on CFAF 6 billion in budgetary allocation
and CFAF 2 billion in foreign financing from the Caisse Française de Développement, the
French Development Agency (CFD) (IMF 1998).
As of 1998, Burkinabe banks held CFAF 10.4 billion in government bonds that were offered
in exchange for the transfer of nonperforming loans (IMF 1998).
9. Eligible Institutions: The BRCB purchased assets from banks that the government
was in the process of recapitalizing or restructuring.
The BRCB was one component of the Burkinabe financial system restructuring, and banks
undergoing other restructuring activities transferred NPLs to the BRCB. There does not
appear to be a limit on which of the eight Burkinabe banks were eligible to transfer
nonperforming assets, though not all banks transferred assets to the BRCB. According to the
IMF, the BICIA-B was in comparatively strong position in 1990, and it decided not to request
support in order to maintain its “image of a quality bank” (IMF 1996).
Not all nonperforming assets were transferred from the BND-B to the BRCB, as some assets
were transferred to the BND-B Liquidation Commission (IMF 1998).
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10. Eligible Assets: It does not appear that there were restrictions on the types of
nonperforming loans eligible for transfer.
Eligible banks transferred portfolios of nonperforming loans to the BRCB. It does not appear
that there were restrictions on the types of nonperforming loans eligible for transfer. As of
1996, the IMF reported that the BRCB’s portfolio included:
• CFAF 13.1 billion in loans to government agencies and enterprises;
• CFAF 10.7 billion in loans to private enterprises that had ceased operations;
• CFAF 24.8 billion in loans to private enterprises still operating but experiencing
financial difficulties; and
• CFAF 10.2 billion in loans to unidentified borrowers.
Loans secured by real estate were eligible for transfer, as the BRCB owned approximately
CFAF 800 million in real estate collateral in 1996 (IMF 1996).
11. Acquisition – Mechanics: The amount of NPLs transferred was based on prior
BCEAO audits of each bank’s financial statement.
Audits from the BCEAO, and later from the Commission Bancaire, examined and determined
the amount of NPLs on the Burkinabe bank balance sheets. Based on the audits and
restructuring plan, the bank and restructuring authorities determined the amount of NPLs
to be transferred to the BRCB (IMF 1996).
12. Acquisition – Pricing: The transferring banks and the government agreed on the
value of NPLs to transfer to the BRCB.
It does not appear that the BRCB published details regarding pricing or asset valuations. As
a part of the audits of the Burkinabe bank balance sheets, the authorities and the banks
would determine the amount of NPLs to be transferred to the BRCB. As a part of the
determination of which loans to transfer, it is expected that the authorities and banks agreed
upon the transfer price (IMF 1996).
13. Management and Disposal: The BRCB recovered CFAF 10.8 billion from its
portfolio through its special authority to seize assets and recover the value of
nonperforming loans from delinquent borrowers.
By 1996, the BRCB had recovered CFAF 5.7 billion from its portfolio on NPLs, and it
ultimately recovered CFAF 10.8 billion by the time of its dissolution (IMF 1996; Tanga 2002).
The exact mechanism for recovery or disposal is unclear, the BRCB had special authority to
seize assets from delinquent borrowers, and the BRCB published a list of delinquent
borrowers in an official government publication in order to improve recovery efforts (IMF
1996).
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14. Timeframe: Although it does not appear that the BRCB had a predefined sunset
date, the government voted to dissolve the BRCB on November 12, 2002.
It does not appear that the BRCB had a predefined sunset date. On November 12, 2002, the
parliamentary body voted on a measure to dissolve the BRCB, with 79 of the 102 officials
voting to dissolve the agency (Tanga 2002). The remainder of the BRCB’s portfolio of assets
was transferred to the Treasury, specifically to the Department of Litigation and Collection
(Tanga 2002).11
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